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Reading vol. 2 of Richard Evans trilogy of The Third Reich one comes across this gem.The British guarantee had some secret qualification that are a revelation to me and further evidence thateven after the rump occupation of Czechoslovakia, Britain still wanted to avoid war–the shadow of the Somme was still a haunting memory.According to Evans (citation appended in the notes) the guarantee would only be honoured it the Poles did not ” show unreasonable and stupid obstinacy” over discussions with Germany over the return of Danzig and the return of the Polish corridor.Well the Poles evidently fouled the nest giving Hitler the war he wanted and the rest as they say is History.
I have never heard this one before. Can you give me the citation. It has always been my understanding that the British guarantee of polish neutrality was much like their guarantee of Belgian neutrality after that countries independence in 1833. I have never heard that there were secret protocols to it.
This is no joke. My wife just took the book back to the Library as I was typing the post. I saw the citation, but did not look at it. I will try to find it as the book was on loan from the downtown branch I cannot get it back for 30 days–alternate source needed. I complete surprise to me also–no Charlatan here!
SCOUT–Here is a taste–we are on the right trackWillyD More as I can find it.However, the British “guarantee” to Poland was not complete, and it addressed only Polish independence and pointedly excluded Polish territorial integrity.
Gentlemen; here might be the information you seek.
Polish-British Common Defence PactFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaBritish embassy in Warsaw, PolandBritish embassy in Warsaw, PolandThe Polish-British Common Defence Pact was an annex to the Franco-Polish Military Alliance signed on August 25, 1939 between representatives of the United Kingdom and Poland. The pact contained promises of mutual military assistance between the nations in the event either was attacked by another European country. The United Kingdom, sensing a dangerous trend of German expansionism, sought to prevent German aggression by this show of solidarity.The pact was preceded by a written “guarantee” of military assistance, issued by the governments of France and Great Britain to those of Germany and Poland on March 30. Both the guarantee and the pact were directed specifically against a possible German invasion and pledged to defend Polish independence. At the time Adolf Hitler was demanding cession of the port of Danzig, military access to the Polish Corridor, and special privileges for the German minority within Poland. By the terms of the military alliance with Great Britain and France, it was left to Poland to decide whether to compromise as the pact did not include any statement of the British commitment to the Polish territorial integrity.[1] Fearing all-out German invasion no matter what, the Poles rejected the German demands.Note penultimate sentence.WillyD
SCOIUT:BINGO:Anita J. Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939, Cambridge University Press, 1987, ISBN 0-521-33148-XWillyD
Agreement of Mutual Assistance Between the United Kingdom and Poland.-London, August 25, 1939.Click on the above for the full text of the agreement between Britain and Poland. Below for more….Click here
Wally: I am becoming even more senile. I do not see the paragraph or sentence that states that the guarantee is NOT a territorial guarantee, but only comes into play if there is an actual military invasion. I must be missing something.Willy D
Not my point to dispute anyone or anything; merely providing links to documents that can help all sort it.
Here is the only relevant passage from their mutual assistance pact.
ARTICLE I.Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.
The key words are ?all the support and assistance in its power?. When they signed the pact in August of 1939 the British knew full well they could provide little or nothing in the way of military support. It was hoped that concluding a treaty would cause Hitler to back down since it was widely regarded at the time that British intervention because of Belgium in 1914 had caused the failure of the Schleiffen plan and they hoped for something similar in this case. The treaty was a line in the sand if you will rather than presaging some expectation of actual military assistance. I do not see how the claim that Poland was betrayed can be substantiated unless you assume that Poles were na?ve enough o think that several British divisions could be magically teleported to Poland in the case of attack. The Baltic was essentially a German lake for most of the war anyway.In the end it is academic because the treaty did not hold Hitler back and guaranteed Britain?s involvement in the war. In one sense the treaty can be considered a failure because it did not achieve what it intended, stopping Hitler.
The key words are ?all the support and assistance in its power?. When they signed the pact in August of 1939 the British knew full well they could provide little or nothing in the way of military support. It was hoped that concluding a treaty would cause Hitler to back down since it was widely regarded at the time that British intervention because of Belgium in 1914 had caused the failure of the Schleiffen plan and they hoped for something similar in this case. The treaty was a line in the sand if you will rather than presaging some expectation of actual military assistance. I do not see how the claim that Poland was betrayed can be substantiated unless you assume that Poles were na?ve enough o think that several British divisions could be magically teleported to Poland in the case of attack. The Baltic was essentially a German lake for most of the war anyway.In the end it is academic because the treaty did not hold Hitler back and guaranteed Britain?s involvement in the war. In one sense the treaty can be considered a failure because it did not achieve what it intended, stopping Hitler….My curiosity was aroused because it seems apparent that the British were hoping that Poland would cometo some kind of agreement with Germany over Danzig and the Corridor which would satisfy HerrHitler and avoid a war. The Poles proved to be quite stubborn and unreasonable. My wife is Russian and Polish and I have a deep understanding of “stubborn” Neither the Poles or the British understood that the Austrian gentleman was convinced that destiny was guiding his hand and that he was absolutelydetermined to go to war in the east– no “agreement” would be acceptable. Once Hitler had seenthe actions of the western powers over the debacle of the Czechoslovakian guarantees, his appetitehad been whetted to the point where only a conflict would satisfy him.In any case my understanding of this question has been improved. Thank you for your assistance.
As I told my classes; “When Chamberlin indicated that he thought the Munich accord had secured 'peace in our time' he had Hitler's concept of peace wrong… Hitler meant piece not peace… 'a piece of that country, a piece of this country, and all of this one'.”
To make it short, just like the dominoes' theory during the Cold War : The start of the war is generally held to be September 1, 1939, with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany and subsequent declarations of war on Germany by France and most of the countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Alliance'treaties just like for WWI.
Hello, From thi place i want to apologize for my English but i'm not an Englishman.
To make it short, just like the dominoes' theory during the Cold War : The start of the war is generally held to be September 1, 1939, with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany and subsequent declarations of war on Germany by France and most of the countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Alliance'treaties just like for WWI.
I must notice, that domineos' theory was not so obvious on September 1.The aliance between Poland and France (signed by ministries in May 1939 ) was not ratified by French parliament until 4th September 1939. French Republic was formally not bound to join the war.What is more, the British guarantee was just “a guarantee”. If I remember correctly the meaning of this term from my law studies – guarantee is not a contract. It doesn't require ratification by parliament and formally does not bound any of the parties to action.
My curiosity was aroused because it seems apparent that the British were hoping that Poland would cometo some kind of agreement with Germany over Danzig and the Corridor which would satisfy HerrHitler and avoid a war. The Poles proved to be quite stubborn and unreasonable. My wife is Russian and Polish and I have a deep understanding of “stubborn” Neither the Poles or the British understood that the Austrian gentleman was convinced that destiny was guiding his hand and that he was absolutelydetermined to go to war in the east– no “agreement” would be acceptable.
I agree on one point – Polish Staff did not expect all out war. However, military preparations were made since March 1939. Work on “battleplan Z” has been started in March. Building of fortifications along the border also was started in spring 1939. What is a proof that Polish Staff did not expect all out war? In the middle of August, when Hitler started secret mobilization all over Germany, Poland started secret mobilization of only “Danzks' intervention corps” (3 infantry division, one cavalry brigade) which was sent to the Corridor for demonstration.Full secret mobilization (all over Poland) wasn't started until evening of 23rd August 1939 and it was commenced because massive German concentration along the border was noticed. If You would like to know some more details from books written by Polish commanders of 1939, I can help 🙂
